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THE LAW OF ESCAPE IN CIVIL ACTIONS.
I. Or TiE COMMITMENT.
1. What is a legal cormitment.-As a general rule, a legal
commitment must be made under the authority of a court of competent jurisdiction, and such is prima facie the authority under,
which the sheriff or other officer holds in custody a person committed under it, even thoughi the commitment itself be invalid and
eventually quashed through error in the proceedings. It is the
duty of the officer to obey any precept which appears on its face.
to have issued from competent authority and with legal regularity:
TIVtson v. J1atson, 9 Conn. 140, s. P. Roth v.-Duvall, 1 Idaho 167;,
Cody v. Quinn, 6 Ired. L. (N. C.) 191. Where the-order of the court
committing a defendant on a ca. sa., who had failed to comply with
the requisition of the act, required him to be taken into immediate
custody and be detained without bail or mainprize until lie pay
off and diseharge the full amount of principal, interest and costs:
.Re, that this order was sufficiently full and explicit to authorize
the sheriff to confine the defendant in the common jail of the
county : Tie Goernor,for use, ,ye.,v. Kenp et al., 12 Ga. 466.
The suffc mg a person committed by competent authority to go at
large is an escape, for it is not for the sheriff to judge of the
validity of the process or other proceedings of such court. The
law, therefore, allows hin, in an action for false imprisonment, to
plead such .authority, which will excuse him, though it be erroVOL. XXVI.-44
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neous. But if the court had no jurisdiction over the matter, then
all is void ab initio, and the officer would not be liable for the escape
of a person taken into custody upon such void authority ; and even
if, from the copy left with the j'ailer, the commitment appears void,
the jailer is not liable: Kidder v. Barker, 18 Vt. 454. The distinction is laid down in Moore 274; Dyer 175; Poph. 203; Leon.
30; 5 Co. 64; 8 Id. 141 b; 10 Id. 76 a; Cro. Jac. 3,280, 289;
2 Bulst. 64, 256; 2 Saund. 100, 101; 3 Mod. 325; Carth. 148,
234. Even though the eapias ad satisfaciendum upon which a
defendant is taken were irregularly issued, without a previous fieri
fadias, or more than a year after the judgment without a scire
facias, it is nevertheless sufficient authority for the sheriff to make
the arrest. Indeed no irregular~ity in the issuing of the process
-will excuse him: Scott v. Shaw, 13 Johns. 378; Hinman v. Prees,
Id. 529; Bissell v. Zi, 5 Id. 89; Ontario Bank v. Hallett, 8
Cowen 192; Jones v. Cook, 1 Id. 309 g. Also, see Shirley v.
Wright, 2 Ld. Raym. 775; 1 Salk. 273; 2 Id. 700, s. P.
A sheriff cannot excuse himself from execution of process because
it is irregular or erroneous, but only where it is absolutely void:
Stoddard v. Tarbell, 20 Vt. 321 ; Roward et al. v. Crawford,for
se, &c., 15 Ga. 423; Woodruff v. Barret, 15 N. J. L. (3 Green)
40; Stevenson v. MeLean, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 332. A jailer is
bound to receive persons committed by the authority of the United
States, and to keep them until discharged by due course of the
laws of the United States: Johnson v. Lewis, 1 Dana (Ky.) 182.
2. Form of commitment.-The sheriff cannot be charged with
an escape before he had the defendant in his actual custody by a
form of commitment issued by a legal authority, such as has been
defined, provided he has done all in his power to arrest him:
Brooke on Escape 22; 8 Bac. Abr. 395. Neither can be be
charged with an escape if, having arrested a person on Sunday,
contrary to the 29 Car. 2, c. 7 (where that statute prevails), and
which would not, therefore, be a legal commitment, he lets him go
again. Vide 6 Mod. 95; Salk. 78. But a sheriff, acting under
the authority of a court having competent jurisdiction, is not liable
for any irregularity and mistake in the exercise of that jurisdiction:
Brown v. Mason, 40 Vt. 157; or for any irregularity or error in
any process under which he is required to act, provided such process emanate from a court having jurisdiction: Price v. Holland,
1 Patt. & H. (Va.) 289.
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WIIAT IS DEEMED

AN ESCAPE.

1. An escape may consist either in the deliverance of a person, who
is lavtully imprisoned, out of prison, before such person is entitled
to such deliverance by law (5 Mass. 310), or in the voluntarily and
negligently allowing any person lawfully in confinement to leave
the place: 2 Bishop Cr. L., § 917. Permitting a prisoner to leave
the place of imprisonment, even for the shortest time, before such delivery by law, constitutes an escape: 9 Johns. 829; Palmerv.Hatch,
Sewell on Sheriffs 440; Jones v. Cook, 1 Cowen 300; and this is
so, even though the debtor return into custody and is in court on
the return day: United States v. Brent, 1 Cranch 0. C. 525. See
also United States v. Williams, 5 Id. 619. But the officer is not
liable for the escape of a debtor whom he has arrested on insufficient process: -Hitehoekv. Baker, 2 Allen (Mass.) 431. A voluntary escape, whether from the jail or from the liberties thereof,
or even the voluntarily granting the prisoner more liberty than
authorized by law, will not be purged by the prisoner's voluntary
return to the jail or its liberties, or even by his recapture, without
affirmance by the plaintiff: 3 Rev. Stats., 5th ed., 786, §§ 84 and
85; .Drake v. Chester, 2 Conn. 473; Wesson v. Cliamberlain, 3
Corns. 331; 1 Salk. 272. There is a distinction between a voluntary and a negligent escape in" civil actions, in respect to the
rights and liabilities of the sheriff suffering such escape, but the
distinction does not prevail in criminal cases: Tillman v. Lansing,
4 Johns. 45; Sewell 441. In Missouri a sheriff is liable as well
for a negligent as for a voluntary escape: Warburton v. Wood, 6
Mo. 8; but this is by statute, the 52d section of the Act of-the
General Assembly (R. C. 1835, p. 260); otherwise it is establishedlaw that fresh pursuit and recaption before action brought is a good
defence against a demand for a negligent escape. But it has been
decided in this same state that a sheriff is not liable for a negligent
escape, if his attention to his duty has been diverted from time
to time by the plaintiff: State v. Woods, 7 Mo. 536. In North
Carolina the officer is liable absolutely in the case of a voluntary
escape, but in the case of a negligent escape he has a right to
retake the prisoner, and if he do retake him on fresh pursuit he is
not liable to an action brought after such recaption and when he
has the prisoner in custody: Adams v. Turrantine, 8 Ired. 147
(Rev. Code, c. 105, § 20). But the action lies for a negligent
escape, evea though there be no actual negligence: Id. The
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meaning of the term " negligent escape" is the same as that given
at the common law. In the case of a voluntary escape, the
sheriff cannot retake the prisoner even upon fresh suit; and if he
does, the prisoner may have an action of trespass against him:
Carter 212; 2 Wils. 295; 5 Term Rep. 25. But this must be
understood of custody in execution, for if the prisoner be in custody on mesne process, the sheriff may retake him after having
permitted him to go at large: Atkinson v. Matteson, 2 Term Rep.
172; Lewis v. 31orland, 2 B. & Ad. 56. Also, if a person
arrested on mesne process be rescued, the sheriff, upon returning
the rescue, is not answerable for the escape, for he is not, in this
case, bound to raise the posse comitatus. But after an arrest upon
a capias ad satisfaciendum, the sheriff cannot effectually return a
rescue, for it is his duty at the time to raise the posse co ntatus,
if needful. In this case, therefore, an action lies for an escape
(State v. Low2y, 8 o. 48), for the return of an ineffectual execution is as none. See 8 Bac. Abr. 404. In South Carolina,
although the sheriff is not bound by law to maintain a prisoner
confined on mesne process, yet if he suffer such prisoner to go at
large, because he was destitute, and the plaintiff refused to pay for
his maintenance, the sheriff is nevertheless liable (NOTT, J., dissenting): MLain v. H~ayne, 1 Treadway Const. Rep. 212.
An escape is voluntary when it is with the assent of the officer
having the prisoner in custody. And it is negligent when such
escape is without the knowledge or assent of such officer: Crocker
on Sheriffs 282, c. 85, § 1. Where a sheriff discharges a debtor
on a bail bond, which proves to be a forgery as to the signature of
the bail, this is a voluntary escape, and the sheriff is liable though
ignorant of the forgery: Conyers v. 1?hame, 11 Rich. 60. And
where a witness states that while he was at breakfast a prisoner
who -was in custody of the sheriff "made his escape" the fair inference is that the prisoner fled from the custody of the sheriff against
consent of the latter: Roward et al. v. Crawford,for qtse, ,ft., 15
Ga. 428. It may here be mentioned that the statutes of 13 Edw.
1, c. 2, and 1 Rich. 8, c. 12, giving a creditor an action of debt
against a sheriff who shall wilfully or negligently suffer a debtor to
escape, are not in force in Georgia: Id. In fact every liberty
given to a prisoner which is not authorized by law is an escape:
Colby v. Sampson, 5 Iass. 810; Lowry v. Barney, 2 D. Chip.
(Vt.) 11; Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Mass. 891; Clap v. Cafran,
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7 Id. 101 ; Bartlet v. lillis,3 Id. 107 ; 18 Johns. 48; 9 Id. 329;
13 Id. 308; ; 5 Id. 115; 15 Id. 152; 3 Binn. 404; Komnies v.
MXddox, 2 liar. & G. 106; Jones v. The State, &e., 3 Itar. &
Johns. 559. And every person in prison by process of law is to
be kept in salcw et areta eustodi,: Plowd. 3 ; 3 Co. 44 ; 2 Inst.
381; Rl,. Abr. 806. It is therefore an escape if the prisoner is
pcrmitteil to occupy the parlor or sitting room of the sheriff though
under the same roof as the common jail : P'eople v. Stone, 10 Paige
(N. Y.) 606.
In Indiana, an action for debt lies against sheriff for an escape
on execution, the English statutes being in force there: G'winn v.
ilullard, 3 Blackf. 14. The ,heriff is also liable though there be
no jail in the county. In Virginia, under the statute, an action
of debt may be maintained against a sheriff for either wilful or
negligent escape, and to defeat the action the defendant must show
that the escape was tortious and that fresh pursuit was made:
,S'tone v. JWil.3on, 10 Grattan (Va.) 529. In North Carolina,
where a sheriff voluntarily permits a prisoner to escape, the sheriff
is liable for the debt, even though he may afterwards retake the
prisoner: Lush v. Ziglar, 5 Ired. (N. C.) L. 702. In Maryland,
before the Act of 1811, c. 161, if the sheriff made an arrest under
a eeqpas on final prQcess, and suffered the party arrested to escape,
lie could not again arrest the same party on the same process without rendering himself liable to an action for false imprisonment.
This disability was removed by the Act of 1811, c. 161, § 2, and by
it power was conferred on the sheriff to make a second arrest by
virtue of the same process; but this act did not protect the sheriff
from liability to the plaintiff for an escape: State v. Lawson, 2
Gill. 62. See Const. 1864, art. 3, § 37.
2. If by color of a,wi'it of habeas COewys the sheriff or other officer
having tile custody of a prisoner, suffer him to go at large, it is an
escape: Ilob. 202; 3 Co. 44 ; Cro. Car. 14; People v. Stone, 10
Paige (N. Y.) 606. It has also been adjudged that if the sheriff
suffer the prisoner to go at large between the issue and the return
of the writ of habeas Torpus, even tlough the prisoner appeared at
the return of the writ, it is an escape: Hard. 476; agreed by
IIALH, Chief Baron, and the whole court. And yet in Bofiton's
(Oseit was held (3 Co. 44), that where the prisoner on his way to
court, but before the day when tle writ is returnable, goes of his
own head and without any keeper away from the sheriff's custody,
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but returns the next morning so that at the return of the habeas
corpus the sheriff delivers him into court, this is no escape. But
this was admitted to be a favorable construction of law, the prisoner
having escaped into another county out of the sheriff's jurisdiction.
The rule that a ministerial officer is protected by the writ of a
competent court, good on its face, is a rule of protection merely,
and is personal to the officer: Tuttle v. Wilson, 24 Ill. 553.
If the defendant escape at any time after the return day of the
writ, and before execution, the sheriff is liable, whether the escape
be voluntary or negligent: Stone v. Woods, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 182.
The removal of a prisoner having the liberties of the jail from the
limits thereof, by virtue of a valid legal process which 'ffords justification to the officer taking him thence, is not an escape within 2
Rev. Stat. 473, § 63, 1864; Wickens v. Willet, 4 Abb. (N. Y.)
App. Dec. 596. But the taking a prisoner, by virtue of a habeas
corpus, out of the shortest and most convenient route, though the
sheriff produces the prisoner at the return of the writ, is an escape:
People v. Sone, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 606.
Upon the whole, it has long been settled both here and in England that taking a prisoner, who was imprisoned on execution in a
civil suit, away from the prison or jail liberties on a habeas corpus
ad testificandum, to testify, was no escape* Noble v. Smith, 5
Johns. 359; ffassam v. Grffin, 18 Id. 48; Wattles v. Marsh,
5 Cowen 176; Martin v. Wood, 7 Wend. 132; 3 Esp. Cas. 283;
8 Burr. 1440 ; 4 East 587. And this even though the sheriff
take the prisoner out of his county but returns with him again
without any unnecessary delay: Hassam v. Griffin, 18 Johns. 48.
3. Constructive escape.-Constructive escapes are such as take
place when the prisoner obtains more liberty than the law allows,
although he still remains in confinement: Bac. Abr. -Escape (B.);
Plowd. 17; 5 Mass. 310; 2 Mason C. C. 486. The following cases
are examples of such escapes: when a man marries his prisoner:
Bac. Abr. Escape (B.) 3; Plowd. 17; if an underkeeper be taken
in execution and delivered at the prison, and neither the sheriff
nor any authorized person be there to receive him : Colby v. Sanipson, 5 Mass. 310 ; and where the keeper of the prison made one of
the prisoners confined for debt a turnkey, and trusted him with the
keys: Wilkes v. Slaughter, 8 Hawk. 211; Skinner v. White, 9
N.1H. 204; Steere v. -ield, 2 Mason 486; Gage v. Graffam, 11
Mass. 101 ; Day v. Brett, 6 Johns. 22.
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And according to the statute law of England (8 & 9 W. 3, c.
27, § 8) "if the marshal or warden for the time being, or their
respective deputy or deputies, or other keeper or keepers of any
other prison or prisoners, shall after one day's notice in writing
given for that purpose, refuse to show any prisoner committed in
execution to the creditor at whose suit such prisoner was committed or charged, or to his attorney, every such refusal shall be
adjudged to be an escape in law."
4. Voluntary escape.-Itwas formerly held that where the sheriff
suffered a prisoner in execution to make a voluntary escape, the
prisoner was in such case absolutely discharged from the creditor,
and that the right of action was entirely transferred against the
sheriff, who by means of such escape became debitor ex delicto : 3
Bac. Abr. 403; Arundell v. JVfytham, Leon. 73; s. P. per HOBART
in the Sheriff of Essex's Case, Hob. 202. But latter decisions
have been contrary, and it has been since adjudged in numerous
cases that where a sheriff suffered a voluntary escape, the plaintiff
might have a new action of debt or scire facias quare executionem non against the prisoner: Allan8on v. Butler, Sid. 330;
Buxton v. Home, Show. 174; Basset v. Salter, 2 Mod. 136;
James v. Pierce, Vent. 269; Compton v. Ireland, 1 Mod. 194;
Sudal v. Wytham, 2 Lutw. 1264; Appleby v. Clark, 10 Mass.
59 ; Brown v. Getchell, 11 Id. 11 ; Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Id.
391; Cheever v. 1Ierrick, 2 N. II. Rep. 376.
In Connecticut, if a debtor in prison on execution immediately
goes out of jail, on taking the poor debtor's oath, with the consent
of the jailer, it is a voluntary escape: Wells v. Lindsey, 2 Root
(Conn.) 481; .Bowen v. Huntingdon, 8 Conn. 423. But the mere
employment of a prisoner by the jailer to render certain services
in connection with the care of the jail, and even'being sometimes
-,intrusted with the keys, such services being rendered under the
immediate supervision of the jailer and all within the prison liberties, has been held not to constitute a voluntary escape: Bolton v.
Cummings, 25 Conn. 410. Where an officer, having arrested a
prisoner on a warrant, left him upon his promise to follow him, and
the prisoner escaped and was not overtaken by the constable, held,
that this was a voluntary escape, and although the prisoner was
afterwards arrested on a bench warrant the constable was nevertheless held liable: Olmstead v. Bay/mond, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 62.
Where a sheriff discharges a prisoner on a bail bond, which proves
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to be forged, though the sheriff was ignorant of the forgery, this
constitutes a voluntary escape: Conyers v. Rhame, 11 Rich. (S. C.)
60. But a sheriff is not liable for a voluntary escape after he has
taken a bond for the prison limits: Lyfle v. Stephenson, 6 Call
(Va.) 54. It is sufficient evidence, prima facie, to charge a sheriff
With an escape that the prisoner was seen at large walking in the
streets: Steward v. Kip, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 165. There is this
difference between a voluntary and a negligent escape. For if a
sheriff suffer a prisoner to go at large, the sheriff cannot retake
him even upon fresh suit, and if he does the prisoner may have an
action of trespass against him: Carter 212; 2 Wils. 295; ' T. R.
25; Tillman v. Lansing, 4 Johns. 47; Peters v. Henry, 6 Id.
123; Richmond v. Tallmadge, 16 Id. 307. But this must be
taken with limitation, for if the prisoner be in custody on mesne
process the sheriff may retake him notwithstanding his permission:
Attkinson v. Matteson, 2 T. R. 172; Lewis v. M11foreland, 2 Barn.
& Ad. 56.' But in North Carolina, the sheriff remains liable for
the debt even though he may afterwards retake the priso~er : Lush
v. Ziglar, 5 Ired. (N. C.) L. 702. The South Carolina Act of
1788 is express that the sheriff shall be ultimately liable for an
escape: Clark v. Moore, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 62.
5. Negligent escape.-A negligent escape takes place when the
prisoner goes at large unlawfully, either because the building or
prison in which he is confined is too weak to hold him : Parsonsv.
Lee, Jefferson's Rep. 50; Smith v. JHart, 1 Brevard 146; or because the keeper, by carelessness, lets him go out of prison. The
piisoner may, in the case of a negligent escape, be retaken: 2
Bouv. Inst. 2335. And a jailer shall be excused for a negligent
escape, if he retakes upon fresh pursuit: H. P. C. 114; Dub. 6
H. 7, 11; 10 H. 7, 25,-28 [3 Com. Dig. 571 (A 2)]. The escaping of "aprisoner who has the liberty of the yard, upon bonds, is a
negligent escape: Jones v. Abbee, 1 Root (Conn.) 106; Abel v.
Bennett, Id. 127. Where the sheriff arrested a defendant and
released him by taking bond for his appearance at court, to take
-thebenefit of the act for the relief of honest debtors, in an amount
less than twice the amount of the creditor's demand, the bona
.being taken in good faith by the sheriff: Held, that he was guilty
of a negligent escape, and might retake the defendant in a ca. sa.
and surrender him in court: Colley v. Morgan, 5 Ga. 178. Every
escape is, in the eye of the law, a negligent escape, which does not
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happen by theland of God or public enemies: 7Jrarburto v. Toods,
8 . In Missouri a sheriff is liable for a negligent, as well
6
as fir a volmutary, escape : Id. Also, in Virginia: Stone v. Tfrilson, 11) ( 'att. (Va.) 529; 54th section of the Act of the General
Assembly l. C. 1835, p. 260).es ca By
p e, the statutes of North Car" "voluntary," and " neg l iolia, which use the terms "
gent," in their common-law sense, there are three kinds of escape:
1. 1 oluntatyl escape, in which the sheriff permits the prisoner
to go at large, and in which there is no defence to an action of
debt on his olficial bond. 2. egli nt escape, where the prisoner
breaks out of prison, and is at large without the consent of the
sheriff, to which, on action brought, the sheriff may plead a recapture on a fresh pursuit. 3. An escape effected by tl'e act of God
or the public enemies, on which no action of debt arises. In the
second case, where there has been no recapture on a fresh pursuit,
an fietion of debt against the sheriff may be sustained: Adans v.
Turrenti, 8 Ired. (N. 0.) L. 147 ; _iJfabry v. Turrentine,Id. 201.
6. J'p.,qe on fme'se proess.-If a sheriff suffer a prisoner
arrested on mesne process to escape, an action lies against him, both
at common law and by statute, from the delay and prejudice resulting therefrom : 2 Rol. Abr. 99, 807; Broby v. Lumley, 'Moore 852;
Cro. Eliz. 623, 652, 868; Cro. Jac. 280; and in England, by statute
also, 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 26 (2 B1. Rep. 1049). After an arrest on
mesne process, the jailer may suffer the prisoner to go at large,
provided lie has him at the return of the writ. In Noy 7 2 , a distinction is taken, that in actions for escape on mesne process the
writ surmises that ad largam ire p~ernzisit et non comperuit ad
diem ; but on process of execution ad largam ire permisit is sufficient. Also, upon an arrest on mesne process, the sheriff is
obliged to take bail by the statute 23 Ien. 6, c. 10; but such
Nvas not required by the common law. The effect of a voluntary
escape, if the prisoner was confined on mesne process, is that he
may be again arrested, and no action will lie against the sheriff:
Sir'psol v. JMkitaker, 1 Ilaywood (N. 0.) 225 (257); 2 Bouv.
Inst. 2334. No action will lie for an escape on mesne process, if
the sheriff has the body in court at the return of the writ: 1 Saund:
85, n. 1; Tidd's Pract. 207 and 255. And in an action for an
escape on mesne process the declaration must allege that the defendant in the original suit did not apear at court: 2 Chitty Pl.
299 A, Prec. 289. See Cady v. Hfuntington, 1 N. I. 138, where
VOL. XXVI.-45
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RICHARDSON, C. J., states that the English ca. sa. is the same as
in that state: also, Stone v. Foods, 5 Johns. 182. Although an
action lies against the sheriff (for an escape on mesne process),
'both at common law and by statute, as before mentioned, yet a
sheriff is not guilty of an escape by omitting to take -a prisoner
on mesne process to jail before the return of the writ, nor yet
after, unless the plaintiff is thereby delayed: 5 Term Rep. 37 ;
2 Id. 172. After an arrest on mesne process, officer having suffered a voluntary escape may retake prisoner: Arnold v. Stuves,
10 Wend. 514.
7. -Escape on final process.-If a defendant, when in execution,
be afterwards seen at large, for any the shortest time, even before
the return of the writ, the sheriff will be chargeable for an escape;
for it is his duty to obey the writ, and the writ commands him to'
take the defendant and him safely keep, so that he may have him
ready to satisfy the plaintiff: 8 Bac. Abr. 404. The escape of a
defendant in execution (or final process) remits the plaintiff to all
his former rights, and the imprisonment is no longer a satisfaction:
McGunity v. Hrerrick, 5 Wend. 240, g; 3 Bac. Abr. 405.
In New York, if a constable, who has a prisoner in custody by
virtue of an execution from the justice's court, discharges him even
by order of the justice, who has no authority for that purpose
from the plaintiff, it is an escape for which the constable is liable:
Van Shych v. Taylor, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 146. A deputy sheriff,
having arrested a defendant on execution, left him in charge of the
defendant's two brothers until next day, when he took him to jail:
Held, to be an escape, the persons in whose custody defendant was
left having no authority to retain him: Palmerv. Hatch, 9 Johns.
(N. Y.) 329. Permitting the defendant to go at large, even with
the consent of the plaintiff's. attorney, acting under his general
authority, the sheriff knowing that the judgment had not been
satisfied, is an escape for which the sheriff will be liable: Kellogg
v. CWlbert, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 220. The removal of a defendant,
who had been arrested on an execution, out of the .county in which
he had been arrested, has been held to constitute an escape: MeGruder v. Russell, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 18.
8. What is not an escape.-It will not be an escape if the party
never was in the sheriff's custody, as if the old sheriff does not
deliver him over upon such execution: 3 Co. 72; 2 Cro. 588;
Poph. 85; 2 Leo. 54; Partridge v. Westerelt, 13 Wend. (N.
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Y.) 500. If he be arrested but not- actually committed to jail,
the jailer shall not be charged with an escape: 1 Rol. Abr. 806,
1. 30. If the prisoner be at the house of the jailer, but not
within the prison: Cro. Car. 210. Or if he were not in custody at
the suit of the plaintiff, as if he were taken by a capias utlagatum
or a capiaspro fine, where a capias does not lie in such a suit: 1
Rol. Abr. 810, 1. 30 ; 1 Leo. 263. Or was arrested and suffered to
go at large before the writ of execution delivered to the sheriff, 1
Rol. Abr. 809, 1. 30, it will not be an escape. But no objection to the
process which does not prove the process void will excuse an escape:
Lord Ray. 775. hIence, the officer is not liable for the escape
of a prisoner arrested on insufficient process : Hitchcock v. Baker,
2 Allen (Mass.) 431. So it will not be an escape if the prisoner
goes out of prison by reason of a sudden fire in the jail: 1 Rol. Abr.
808, 1. 7. Or the jail be broken by the king's (or country's) enemies: Brooke on Escape 10; 1 Rol. Abr. 808, 1. 5. Or the defendant be rescued upon mesne process before he was in jail: Mar. 1; 1
Rol. Abr. 807, 1. 35; 2 Cro. 419; 2 Lev. 144; 1 Rol. Abr. 389,
440. So if the defendant be retaken upon fresh suit before the
action commenced for the escape: 1 Rol. Abr. 808, 1. 50 ; 3 Oro.
52; 2 Godb. 434; F. N. B. 130, B. [Com. 422]. Though he
was out of sight. Though the fresh suit was not begun till a day
and a night after the escape, and though the sheriff did not retake
him till lie fled into another county. Though he was not retaken
till seven years after, if it was upon fresh pursuit: 13 Edw. 4,
9 a.; Semb. Godb. 177. So if the prisoner goes out of prison
with the assent of his creditor, though the assent be only by parol,
it will not be an escape provided the parol assent be not given
after a previous escape. Nor yet if the sheriff upon habeas corpus
brings his prisoner to court though he goes out of the direct way.
Nor if a prisoner, brought by habeas corpus, goes out of the custody of the sheriff but returns the next morning and appears at
the return of the writ: .Hassamv. Griffin, 18 Johns. 48. Neither
is it an escape to take a prisoner in execution to a lockup house.
See Com. Dig. 581, 1-2,o(D.).
If the court set aside its execution after arrest, a discharge is
not an escape: Pinkney v. Kagenzan, 53 N. Y. 31.
The following cases have been adjudged applying the ancient
rules of non escape to the varied and altered circumstances of
modern times. It will not, as before mentioned, be an escape if
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the party never was in the sheriff's custody : as if the old sheriff
does not deliver him over upon such execution; the right of the
old sheriff to assign over the prisoner, on civil execution, to his
successor, being for his own security and benefit, and may be
waived by him: Hempstead v. Weed, 20 Johns. (N.Y.) 64. The
R. S. (N. Y.) have not changed the law on this subject; formerly
the assignment of prisoners was at the old sheriff's election, now
it is made, by statute, his duty; but until assignment the prisoners
continue in his custody. If a party be arrested but not actually
committed to jail, the jailer shall not be charged for an escape, even
though the prisoner, who had given bond to be a true prisoner, be
lodged for the night in a house provided by the county for the use
of prisoners, but the jailer exercising no control over the house or
the prisoners: Jacobs v. Tolman, 8 Mass. 161. In Cro. Car.
210 (before referred to), it is said to be no escape if the prisoner
be at the house of the jailer though not within the prison. But in
Burns v. Brian, 1 Spear (S. C.) 131, this must be taken with the
proviso that the debtor be not permitted to be without the yrison
walls without lawful authority.
Where the debtor was on the same day committed to jail on two
executions, at the suit of the same creditor, upon each of which
commitments he executed a bond with sureties for the liberty of
the prison yard, and within thirty days of the said commitments
executed to the jailer but one assignment for the benefit of his
creditors: held, that he had complied literally and substantially
with the requirements of see. 4, c.197, of R. I. iRev. Stat., and
although he did not return to close jail within the said thirty days
had committed no escape upon either of his said bonds: _arrigton v. Allen, 6 R. I. 449. A debtor's fraudulently conveying his
property in trust and then taking advantage of the oath prescribed
by law- for the relief of poor debtors, in Rhode Island, although a
discharge of the debt, is not an escape so that an action can be
maintained on a bond for the liberty of the prison yard: Ammidon
v. Smitl, 1 Wheat. 447. A prisoner is not guilty of an escape by
rendering himself at a place beyond the limits of the prison fo:'
the purpose of taking the poor debtor's oath: Commoniwealth v.
Alden, 4 Mass. 388. Neither is a sheriff liable for an escape in
taking a prisoner, arrested on execution, out of the direct route to
the jail in order to give him the opportunity of obtaining some
necessary apparel and seeing his wife; such being no more than a

THE LAW OF ESCAPE IN CIVIL ACTIONS.

reasonable indulgence prompted by laudable and compassionate
motives: Wood v. Turner, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 420.
Where a
det'endant has given bail in one cause to appear and answer, and is
subsequently arrested in another cause, but is taken on habeas
eorlts before the justice in the first cause, to save the surety from
his liability: H1eld, that the sheriff was not liable for an escape:
Mlartin v. WFood, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 132.
Where a prisoner, who had given bonds for the limits, is arrested
within the limits, by order of the House of Representatives, and is
carried out of the ]imits without his consent, but when released
returns as soon as possible, such absence is no escape for which the
sheriff is liable: W1ielcelhausen v. Willett, 12 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr.
311); 21 How. Pr. 49; 10 Abb. Pr. 164.
The following cases have, in addition, been hold not to constitute
an escape:Going into the jail yard in the night-time, for purposes indispensably necessary, when there were no accommodations within the
jail: -Partridgev. Emw erson, 9 Mass. 122; but see MJIeLellan v.
-Dalton,10 Mass. 190, where the decision depended upon the meaning of the statute of 1784, c. 41, § 8. If the door of a prison, in
which a debtor is confined under a ca. sa., is permitted to remain
open, the debtor not leaving the prison, there is in such case no
constructive escape: Currie v. lTortley, 2 Jones (N. C.) L. 104.
In the course of the judgment, the court expressed an opinion that
the doctrine of constructive escapes had already been carried sufficiently far: Per cur. The statute 13 Edw. 1, c. 1-Rev. Stat.,
c. 109, § 2 0-gives a creditor an action of debt against a sheriff,
who shall wilfully or vu'yligently suffer a debtor to escape; but no
constructive escape is within the act.
D y an Act of Congress (c. 208), passed March 29th 1871, it is
enacted, by section 1, that " whenever any person, who may be
indicted for any criminal offence, shall be held by any sheriff upon
or by virtue of any order, writ or process, issued in any civil action
or proceeding, the court in which such indictment may be pending
may, upon habeas corpus or by order, take such person out of the
custody of such sheriff, and make such disposition of tile prisoner
as such court shall see fit. And it shall be the duty of such
sheriff to obey such writ or order and to make such disposition
of such prisoner as the court may direct; and such disposition
of such prisoner shall not be deemed an escape, and no suit, action

